Paying minorities to leave by Gerver, Mollie
	   1	  




This  paper  received  a  ‘Revise  and  Resubmit’  from  Politics,  Philosophy  and  Economics.  A  
final  decision  is  scheduled  for  February  2017.  
  
  
Over  fifty  years  ago  in  New  Orleans,  white  segregationists  gave  cash  and  transport  to  
African-­‐‑Americans   agreeing   to   move   to   New   York   City.1  In   a   recent   case   in   New  
York,  a  landlord  paid  black  tenants  $12,000  to  leave  their  apartments,   increasing  the  
value   of   the   property   as   only   white   tenants   remained.2  In   a   campaign   proposal   in  
2010,   the  British  National  Party  promised  to  pay  $78,000   to  each  non-­‐‑white  resident  
who  agreed  to  voluntarily  leave  the  country  and  never  return.3    In  theory,  a  family  of  
six  could  receive  half  a  million  dollars  to  move  to  Somalia,  Ethiopia,  or  Iraq.    
  
Is  it  morally  permissible  to  pay  minorities  to  leave?    
  
When   we   think   of   wrongful   discrimination,   we   often   imagine   a   victim’s   options  
constrained.   Victims   are   denied   jobs,   visas,   apartments,   places   in   universities,   and  
equal   rights   before   the   law.  4  Rarely   do  we   imagine   victims   receiving  more   options  
because  they  are  not  wanted.  At  most,  we  imagine  them  receiving  the  same  number  
of   options,   as  when   children   are   segregated   into   separate   schools.  When  minorities  
are   paid   to   leave,   receiving   an   option   unavailable   to   others,   it   remains   unclear  
whether  such  offers  are  morally  permissible.  
  
When   I   write   that   it   is   not   clear   if   such   offers   are   permissible,   I   do   not   claim   that  
scholars   ignore  cases  of  discrimination  where   individuals  benefit.  Deborah  Hellman  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Clive  Webb.   2004.   “’A   Cheap   Trafficking   in   Human  Misery’:   The   Reverse   Freedom   Rides   of   1962,”  
Journal  of  American  Studies  38(2):249-­‐‑271.  
2  DW  Gibson.   2015.   “‘I   Put   in  White   Tenants’:   The   Grim,   Racist   (and   Likely   Illegal)  Methods   of   One  
Brooklyn  Landlord,”  New  York  Magazine  12/5.  
3  Jon  Smith.  2010.  “BNP  would  offer  £50,000  to  leave  the  country,”  The  Independent,  29/4.  
4   Kasper   Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen.   2013.   Born   Free   and   Equal?   A   Philosophical   Inquiry   into   the   Nature   of  
Discrimination.   Oxford:   Oxford   University   Press;   Shlomi   Segall.   2012.   “What'ʹs   so   Bad   about  
Discrimination?”  Utilitas  24(1):  82-­‐‑100.  
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discusses  such  cases,  including  one  involving  the  US  Food  and  Drug  Administration  
marketing  a  specific  heart  medication  to  African-­‐‑Americans,  statistically  more   likely  
to  benefit  from  the  drug.  Advertising  in  this  manner,  she  suggests,  may  reinforce  the  
false   belief   that   races   are   biologically   distinct   from   each   other.   But   in   these   cases,  
Hellman   concludes,   the   government   can   avoid   this   harm   by   emphasizing   that  
African-­‐‑Americans  are  not  a  biologically  distinct  group  of  people.5  No  disclaimer  is  at  
hand  when  minorities  are  paid  to   leave   in  order   to  exclude  them.  The  benefit  arises  
precisely   because   of   racism;   had   the   payer   not   been   racist,   there   would   be   no  
monetary  offer  at  all.  If  there  were  no  monetary  offer,  then  some  minorities  would  be  
worse  off.  
  
In   the   next   section   I  will   argue   that   current   theories   of   discrimination   cannot   quite  
establish  whether  paying  minorities   to   leave   is   all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered   impermissible,  
given   the   benefits   to   the   recipients.   In   Sections   2   I   argue   that   payments   are  
impermissible,   and   ought   to   be   banned,   if   they  demean  or   harm  other  members   of  
society  who  do  not  benefit.  In  Section  3  I  will  consider  when  such  payments  ought  to  
be   outlawed.   I  will   address   the   concern   that,   in   banning   such   payments,   states   are  
undermining  the  liberty  of  minorities  who  wish  to  accept  these  payments.    
  
Before  proceeding,  a  brief  note  on  my  assumptions  and  limitations.    
  
I  shall  generally  use  the  term  “discrimination”  in  its  non-­‐‑normative  sense  to  describe  
any  differential  treatment.  My  goal  is  to  consider  whether  paying  minorities  to  leave  
is  the  type  of  differential  treatment  that  is  morally  permissible.    
  
I   shall   assume   that   an  act   can  be  permissible   even   if  wrong   in   some  ways.6  When   I  
write  “wrong  in  some  ways”  I  mean  there  are  ethical  reasons  to  avoid  the  act,  even  if  
there  are   countervailing   reasons   to  partake   in   the  act.  When   I  write   “permissible”   I  
mean   that,   because   these   countervailing   reasons  are   especially  weighty,   individuals  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Deborah  Hellman.  2008.  When  Is  Discrimination  Wrong?  Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press:  67  
6  More  generally,  I  assume  that  an  act  can  be  morally  permissible  even  if  wrong.  See  Julia  Driver.  1992.  
“The  Suberogatory”,  Australasian  Journal  of  Philosophy,  70:  286–295.  
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are  morally   permitted   to   engage   in   the   act,   and   others   have   reasons   to   permit   and  
legalize   the   act.7  I   assume   that   one   reason   to   permit   a   wrongful   act   is   that   the  
consequences   are   sufficiently   beneficial   for   a   victim,   who   also   consents   to   the   act  
because  of  these  benefits.    For  an  example  of  such  an  act,  consider  a  sexist  individual  
who  believes  women  are  mentally  inferior  to  men  and  so,  as  a  result,  helps  women  in  
need   by   providing   donations   to   women’s   shelters.   While   this   man’s   actions   have  
some   wrong-­‐‑making   features,   including   his   sexist   intentions   and   the   demeaning  
nature   of   his   assistance,   his   actions   may   still   be   permissible   due   to   the   benefit  
obtained   for   the  women   he   assists.  At   the   very   least,   it   is  worth   considering  when  
such  actions  may  be  permissible  despite   their  wrong-­‐‑making  features.  This   is  not   to  
claim   that   actions   are   permissible   based   solely   on   consequences   or   that,   if   an  
individual   acts   permissibly,   they   are   not  worthy   of  moral   condemnation.  Nor   do   I  
assume   that,   if  an   individual  benefits   from  a  permissible  act,   they  must  be  grateful.  
Rather,  my  assumption   is  merely   that  benefits   can  create  countervailing   reasons   for  
establishing  permissibility.    
  
When  presenting  my  argumentation,  I  shall  generally  assume  that  paying  minorities  
to  leave  has  wrong-­‐‑making  features.  Intuitively,  this  seems  clear,  and  I  shall  present  
theories   that   explain   this   intuition.   But   though   the   payments   have   wrong-­‐‑making  
features,  the  benefits  may  still  constitute  a  countervailing  reason  to  permit  the  act.  My  
goal  is  to  establish  when  this  countervailing  reason  is  sufficient  to  permit  the  act,  and  
when  it  is  not.  
  
Throughout  the  article,  I  will  largely  remain  neutral  as  to  the  full  range  of  reasons  for  
why  discrimination  is  wrong.  Some  argue  discrimination  is  wrong  when  it  excludes  
individuals,   others   when   it   denies   opportunities,   others   when   it   demeans,   and   so  
forth.  Some  believe,  as  I  do,  that  discrimination  can  be  wrong  for  two  or  more  of  these  
reasons,  depending  on  the  context.8  My  goal  is  not  to  prove  that  any  one  or  more  of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  There  may  be  a  distinction  between   claiming  a  person   is  morally  permitted   to   engage   in  an  act,   and  
claiming   that  others  have  decisive   reasons   to  permit   the   act.   I   shall   generally  not  distinguish  between  
these  two  understandings  of  permissible,  as  nothing  in  my  argument  rests  on  the  distinction.    
8  Sophia  Moreau.  2010.  "ʺWhat  is  Discrimination?"ʺ  Philosophy  and  Public  Affairs  38(2),  see  pages  p.  157-­‐‑
160;   David   Benatar.   2012.     The   Second   Sexism:  Discrimination  Against  Men   and   Boys,  Malden,   USA   and  
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these  reasons  explains  the  wrongness  of  discrimination.  It  is  to  demonstrate  that,  even  
when  there  are  multiple  reasons  to  view  discrimination  as  wrong,  there  remains  the  
competing  consideration  that  victims  consent  to  these  payments  because  they  benefit.  
When   this   competing   consideration   is   present,   a   question   arises   as   to   whether   the  
discrimination  is  permissible.  It  is  this  question  I  address.    
  
When  I  speak  of  benefits,  I  speak  primarily  of  monetary  goods.  I  hold  these  benefits  
to  be  of  moral  significance  not  merely  because  victims  gain  materially,  but  because  of  
the   non-­‐‑material   goods   that   money   can   buy,   including   access   to   mobility   and  
employment   in  distant  cities,  and  the  self-­‐‑respect   that  comes  with  this  employment.  
When  individuals  are  very  disadvantaged,  money  can  also  narrow  the  gap  between  
the  worst   off   and   best   off,   helping   individuals   access   opportunities   they   otherwise  
might  not  obtain,  and  the  means  to  pay  for  rent,  food,  books,  toys  for  one’s  children,  
leisure  time,  and  the  moment  of  respite  that  comes  with  being  handed  a  large  amount  
of  money.  
  
Though   I   focus   on   monetary   benefits,   we   might   also   imagine   non-­‐‑monetary  
incentives   to   leave.   Minorities   might   be   offered   free   housing   far   away,   or   free  
scholarships   to   study   in   a   distant   institution.  We  might   imagine   an   employer  who,  
rather  than  firing  minorities,  promotes  them  to  better  positions,  with  offices  far  away.  
I  mostly   put   these   cases   aside.   This   is   largely   because,  when  minorities   historically  
have  been  paid  hard  cash  to  leave,  the  racist  and  sexist  intentions  of  the  payers  have  
been   especially   salient,   as   have   the   benefits   for   recipients.   As   such,   the   tension  
between  two  competing  considerations  is  especially  clear.    
  
Though  I   focus  on  the  puzzle  of  payments   to   leave,   resolving   it  can  help  clarify   the  
scope  of  wrongful  discrimination  more  generally.  By  looking  at  cases  where  victims  
of  discrimination  acquiesce   to  discriminatory  payments  –  because   they  benefit  –  we  
can  better  establish  whether  benefits  matter  in  deciding  when  differential  treatment  is  
decisively  impermissible,  and  should  be  illegal.  Resolving  this  puzzle  can  also  build  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Oxford,   UK:   Wiley-­‐‑Blackwell,   see   page   p.   5;   Tom   Parr   and   Adam   Slavney.   2016.   “Harmless  
Discrimination.”  Legal  Theory  (Forthcoming).    
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on   current   debates   regarding   monetary   transactions   more   generally.   It   has   been  
argued   that   certain   markets   are   unethical   because   they   function   under   unjust  
background  conditions,  or  reinforce  stereotypes,  or  strengthen  objectionable  norms.9  I  
shall   show   that   paying   minorities   can   have   these   impacts,   but   consider   whether  
payments   ought   to   still   be   permitted,   given   the   consent   and   benefits   for   minority  
members.    
  
In  describing  minority  members,  I  shall  mostly  focus  on  ethnic  and  gender  groups,  all  
of   whom   I   shall   call   “minorities.”   I   will   not   significantly   address   discrimination  
against   other   groups,   such   as   disabled   individuals   or   senior   citizens   paid   to   leave  
institutions,   companies,   or   buildings.   This   is   for   simplicity.   If   you   believe   that  
discrimination   against   other   groups   is   similar,   this   is   consistent   with   the  
argumentation  I  put  forth.  
  
Finally,  I  put  aside  cases  of  structural  injustice,  where  no  agent  has  an  explicit  intent  
to  exclude.10  I   limit  myself  to  cases  where  the  discriminator  pays  minorities  with  the  
motive  of  encouraging  them  to  leave,  because  they  are  valued  less.  These  cases  have  
been  overlooked,  but  are  prevalent.  Current   theories  on  discrimination  do  not  quite  
resolve  whether  such  payments  are  permissible,  and  how  the  state  should  respond.    
  
1.  Four  Theories  
  
To  demonstrate  why  current  theories  of  discrimination  cannot  establish  when  paying  
minorities   to   leave   is   impermissible,   it   is   helpful   to   consider   how  different   theories  
might  respond  to  the  case  of  the  White  Citizens  Council.    
  
The   White   Citizen   Council   was   an   organization   established   in   the   1950s   to   keep  
segregation  legal  in  the  American  South.  They  lobbied  congressmen,  boycotted  black-­‐‑
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Deborah   Satz.   2010.  Why   Some   Things   Should  Not   Be   for   Sale:   The  Moral   Limits   of  Markets,   New   York.  
Oxford  University  Press,  p  130  and  Anne  Phillips.  2013.  Our  Bodies,  Whose  Property?  Princeton:  Princeton  
University  Press;  Michael   Sandel.   2012.  What  Money  Can’t  Buy:  The  Moral  Limits  of  Markets,  New  York:  
Penguin.  
10  Fred  Pincus.   1994.   “From   Individual   to  Structural  Discrimination,”   in  Fred  L.  Pincus  and  Howard   J.  
Ehrlich,  eds.  Race  and  Ethnic  Conflict,  Boulder,  CO:  Westview,  pp.  82–87,  84.  
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owned   businesses,   and   even   produced   a   children’s   book   that   taught   heaven   was  
segregated.11  By   1962   they   failed   to   keep   segregation   legal,   and   so   changed   their  
tactics,  offering  thousands  of  African-­‐‑Americans  money  to  leave  southern  states  and  
move  north.  The  first  recipients  of  this  offer  were  Louis  and  Dorothy  Boyde  and  their  
eight  children,  all   living  in  New  Orleans.  Louis  had  recently  lost  his   job  after  falling  
ill,  and  Dorothy  was  expecting  another  child.  They  accepted  the  Council'ʹs  $50,  food,  
and  bus  tickets  out  of  town,12  arriving  in  New  York  City  two  days  later,  elated  to  start  
a   new   life   with   less   overt   racism,   more   stability,   and   greater   employment  
opportunities.13  The  Council  had  many  goals   in   sponsoring   their  migration,  but  one  
was  to  reduce  the  number  of  African-­‐‑Americans  in  New  Orleans.14      
  
There   are   four   theories  we  might   raise   to   establish  whether   the  Council’s   offer  was  
permissible.   The   first   three   theories   struggle   to   establish  why   paying  minorities   to  
leave  may  be  wrong   in  any  sense.   I   take   this  as  a  point  against  such  theories,  given  
the   intuitive   feeling   that   something   is   wrong   in   the   actions   of   the   White   Citizens  
Council.  The   fourth   theory  establishes   the  wrongness  of  paying  minorities   to   leave,  
but  does  not  establish  if  the  payments  are  permissible,  given  the  benefits  and  consent  
of  the  recipients.    
  
1.1  Other  features  
The  first   theory  is  not  quite  a   theory,  but  a  claim:  The  Council’s  payments  were  not  
themselves  wrong  or  impermissible.  It  was  the  other  features  of  the  case  that  indicate  
impermissible  actions.  
  
There  are  three  other  features  of  the  case,  other  than  payments,  which  could  indicate  
impermissibility.  The  council  engaged  in  other  racist  activities,  and  there  was  general  
racism   in   New   Orleans.   Payments,   we   might   suppose,   indicate   other   forms   of  
wrongful   discrimination,   and   are   not   themselves   wrong.   Any   institution   that   pays  
minorities   to   leave   is   probably   living   in   a   society   where   minorities   cannot   attend  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Timothy  B  Tyson.  2005.  Blood  Done  Sign  My  Name:  A  True  Story.  USA:  Random  House,  p.  182.  
12  Webb  ibid,  249.  
13  Webb  ibid,  249.  
14  Webb  ibid,  253.  
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certain   schools,   buy   certain   houses,   or  walk   down   the   street  without   fear   of   being  
attacked.   At   the   very   least,   it   is   a   society   with   widespread   implicit   biases   and  
structural   inequalities,   and   it   is   these   inequalities   alone   that   are   wrong   and  
impermissible  to  support.    
  
Another   possible   wrong-­‐‑making   feature   is   related   to   the   involuntariness   of   the  
Boydes’   decision.   As   victims   of   severe   poverty   and   general   racism,   they   were  
compelled  to  accept  the  free  transport  and  cash.15  If  ethnic  minorities  are  compelled  to  
leave  town,  they  are  victims  of  forced  discrimination.  Perhaps  it  is  the  forced  nature  
of  their  departure  that  disturbs  us,  rather  than  the  offer  of  money  itself.      
  
Finally,   some   might   argue   that   the   Bodyes   were   wronged   because   they   were  
exploited,   rather   than   because   they   were   paid.   In   general,   wrongful   exploitation  
occurs   when   we   enter   a   transaction   with   an   individual   whose   rights   have   been  
violated,   and   we   benefit   off   of   their   rights   violations.   If   a   factory   owner   hires   a  
worker,   paying   her   a   piece   of   bread   a   day,   and   the   reason   she   accepts   such   a   low  
wage   is  because  her   land  has  been   stolen,   then   she   is  being  exploited.16  Similarly,   if  
the  Boydes’  reasons  for  accepting  the  $50  were  because  of  general  discrimination  and  
poverty   in  New  Orleans,   they  were  wrongly  exploited.  The  White  Citizens’  Council  
gained   from   the  Boydes'ʹ  unjust   circumstances   in   the   sense   that,   for   a  mere   $50,   the  
Council   could   encourage   African-­‐‑Americans   to   leave,   satisfying   their   racist  
preferences.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15    Webb  ibid,  249.  
16  This  theory  of  exploitation  is  slightly  different  than  that  raised  by  others,  such  as  Valdman  and  Steiner.  
Both  claim  that,  to  wrongfully  exploit  another  person,  it  must  the  case  that  the  exploited  gain  less  from  
the  exploiter  than  some  counter-­‐‑factual  state  of  affairs  where  the  exploited  were  not  vulnerable  or  had  
their  rights  violated.  This  formulation  is  problematic.  Consider  the  following  example:  a  starving  person  
agrees  to  accept  a  piece  of  bread  to  work,  but  had  she  not  been  vulnerable  or  had  her  rights  violated,  she  
would  have  accepted  nothing  at  all,  and  volunteered  for  the  factory.  It  still  seems  like  exploitation  if  the  
woman  really  is  vulnerable  or  had  her  rights  violated  even  though,  in  a  counter-­‐‑factual  world  where  she  
was  not  vulnerable  or  had  her  rights  violated,  she  would  have  accepted  the  same  or  less  payment.  She  is  
exploited,  I  believe,  because  her  reasons  now  for  accepting  only  a  piece  of  bread  is  that  she  is  vulnerable  
or  had  her   rights  violated.  See  Mikhail  Valdman,  “A  Theory  of  Wrongful  Exploitation,”  Philosophers’  
Imprint   9(6)(2009):1-­‐‑14;   Hillel   Steiner,   “A   Liberal   Theory   of   Exploitation,”   Ethics   94(2)(1984):225-­‐‑241;  
Hillel   Steiner,   “Liberalism,   Neutrality,   and   Exploitation,”   Politics,   Philosophy,   and   Economics  
12(4)(2013):  335-­‐‑344.  
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I   do   not   believe   that   these   other   features   of   the   case   –   racism   in  New  Orleans,   the  
involuntariness   of   the   consent,   or   exploitation   –   can   fully   explain   the   intuition   that  
there   is   something   wrong   with   paying   minorities   to   leave.   Imagine   the   Council  
consisted  of  exactly  one  white  supremacist  living  in  a  very  tolerant  city.  She  spent  her  
days  knocking  on  the  doors  of  ethnic  minorities,  offering  money  on  the  condition  that  
they   leave   town,   and   recipients   accepted   the   money   without   facing   any   coercion,  
poverty,   or   rights   violations.   Many   may   feel   uneasy   about   such   payments   even  
though   they   entail   no   other   forms   of   racism,   coercion,   or   exploitation.   Something  
seems  wrong,  and  a  good  theory  of  discrimination  will  explain  why.  
  
1.2  Harm  and  Belief-­‐‑Based  Theories  
There   are   two   theories   of   discrimination   that   struggle   to   explain   the  wrongness   of  
payments   to   leave,   let   alone   if   they   are   permissible.   The   first   theory   claims   that  
discrimination  is  wrong  if  it  harms  its  victims.  Different  theorists  claim  that  different  
harms   are   morally   relevant.   Some   claim   that   discrimination   is   wrong   when   it  
excludes   minority   members,   even   if   they   are   not   made   worse   off.17  Others   claim  
discrimination   is  wrong  when   it   disadvantages   the  worst   off   in   society,18  or   denies  
minorities  equal  opportunities.19  Finally,  some  claim  discrimination  is  wrong  when  it  
widens  the  gap  between  advantaged  and  disadvantaged  groups.20    
  
These  Harm-­‐‑based  theories  seem  to  imply,  counter-­‐‑intuitively,  that  there  was  nothing  
wrong  with  the  Council  paying  the  Boydes,  because  they  were  not  harmed.  Though  
the   Boydes   left,   they   were   not   excluded   in   the   traditional   sense.   They   were   never  
forced   to   leave,   and   the  money  helped   them  escape   a   society   full   of   exclusion,   and  
join   one  with   less   segregation   and   far  more   job   opportunities.  While   it   is   true   that  
leaving  New  Orleans  was   likely   a   difficult   experience,   prying   them   away   from   the  
friends,  families  and  home  they  knew,  it  also  helped  them  obtain  opportunities  they  
preferred   to   have.   Nor   did   the   family   just   happen   to   benefit   from   the   Council’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Hugh  Collins.  2003.  “Discrimination,  Equality,  and  Social  Inclusion,”  Modern  Law  Review  66(1):  16–43  
18  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen,  Kasper.  2006.  “The  Badness  of  Discrimination”,  Ethical  Theory  and  Moral  Practice  9:  
167-­‐‑85,  167.  
19  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen  2013,  175  and  Segall  2012.  
20  Tarunabh  Khaitan.  2015.  A  Theory  of  Discrimination  Law,  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press.  
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discriminatory   payment   scheme,   as   when   a   person   is   denied   a   job   opportunity,  
moves  to  another  city,  and  happens  to  find  greater  opportunities  and  advantages  in  
this   new   city. 21   The   White   Citizens’   Council   specifically   intended   for   African-­‐‑
Americans  to  benefit  from  migrating,  to  persuade  them  to  leave  and  never  come  back.    
  
The  Boydes,  as  members  of  a  disadvantaged  group,  were  also  never  made  worse  off  
by   the  payments,   or  denied   the   same  opportunities   as  white   residents.  Nor  did   the  
payments  widen  the  gap  between  their  position  and  the  position  of  white  residents  of  
New  Orleans.   Precisely   the   opposite:     As   they   boarded   the   bus,   cash   in   hand,   they  
were  given  one  extra  opportunity   that  white   residents  did  not  have,   including  very  
poor   residents   who   preferred   funds   to   leave,   but   could   not   access   these   funds.   It  
seems   oddly   to   fall   under   the   category   of   affirmative   action,   which   Lippert-­‐‑
Rasmussen  argues  is  a  form  of  justified  discrimination.  The  bus  tickets  and  money,  to  
use  his  words,  closed  “the  gap  between  how  well-­‐‑off  those  who  benefit  unjustly  from  
discrimination   are   and   how  well-­‐‑off   they  would   be   if   no   discrimination   took   place  
henceforth.”22    
  
Harm-­‐‑based   theories   similarly   struggle   to   establish   the   wrongness   of   other   cases  
involving   payments.   Today,   some   attorneys   claim   that   women   can   receive   higher  
severance   pay   if   they   prove   they   were   discriminated   against,   including   in   the  
termination   of   their   contract.23  If   this   is   true,   some   companies   may   essentially   pay  
women   to   leave,   offering   generous   severance   to   women   in   return   for   their   quiet  
acquiescence  to  the  termination  of  their  contract.  These  women  may  be  better  off  than  
if   they   received   no   extra   severance   pay,   and   slightly   closer,   economically,   to   their  
male   counterparts.  We  might   even   imagine  a  woman  paid   to   leave  a   company  and  
made   economically   better   off   than   if   no   discrimination   had   taken   place   at   all,  
receiving  more  money  than  the  men  received  in  their  salary  and  severance  pay.  If  we  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  One   might   think   that,   if   a   minority   member   just   happens   to   benefit   from   discrimination,   but   this  
benefit  was  not  the  intent  of  the  discriminator,  then  the  minority  member  was  still  wronged.  This  is  an  
argument  raised  by  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen.  See  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen  2013,  157.  
22  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen  2006,  160.  
23  Bosin,  Andrew  S.  LLC.  “Discrimination  and  Harassment  Claims  Could  Increase  Amount  of  Severance  
Offered,”   downloaded   on   20   July   2015   from:   http://www.njbusiness-­‐‑
attorney.com/articles/discrimination-­‐‑harassment-­‐‑claims-­‐‑increase-­‐‑severance.html.  
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intuitively  feel  there  is  something  wrong  about  such  severance  pay,  a  good  theory  of  
discrimination  should  explain  why.  
  
A   second   set   of   theories,   called   “Belief-­‐‑based   theories,”   can   better   account   for   the  
intuition  that  something  is  wrong.  These  theories  view  discrimination  as  wrong  when  
the   result   of   racist   or   sexist   beliefs,   regardless   of   whether   victims   are   excluded   or  
disadvantaged.24  The  Council  had  racist  intentions  when  paying  blacks  to  leave,  and  
companies   may   have   sexist   intentions   when   paying   women   to   leave.   It   is   these  
intentions  which  are  wrong.    
  
Though   Belief-­‐‑based   theories   explain   the   wrongness   in   these   types   of   cases,   they  
cannot   explain   the   wrongness   of   paying   minorities   to   leave   without   any   racist   or  
sexist  intentions.  Consider  the  case,  from  2015,  involving  a  Brooklyn  landlord  paying  
$12,000   to   black   residents   agreeing   to   vacate   their   apartments,   never   paying  white  
residents  this  money.  His  interests  were  financial:  an  all-­‐‑white  building  increased  the  
market  value  of  his  property,  allowing  him  to  charge  more  rent.25  He  may  have  had  
prejudicial  beliefs  –  a  recent  interview  suggests  he  did26  -­‐‑-­‐‑  but  if  he  did  not,  his  actions  
still  seem  disturbing,  even  if  they  were  motivated  solely  by  financial  gain.  While  it  is  
true   that   discrimination   can   be  wrong   because   of   racist   intentions   alone,27  it   seems  
that  paying  minorities  to  leave  is  wrong  even  when  there  are  no  racist  intentions.  
  
Some  may  argue  that  the  case  of  the  Brooklyn  landlord  is  a  case  of  racist  beliefs.  The  
landlord  was  responding  to  the  demands  of  white  renters  willing  to  pay  more  to  live  
in   an   all-­‐‑white   apartment.   These   white   renters   had   racist   beliefs,   or   at   least  
objectionable   preferences   and   biases.   It   is   wrong,   some   argue,   to   discriminate   in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Richard   Arnson.   2006.   “What   is   Wrongful   Discrimination?”   San   Diego   Law   Review   43(4):775-­‐‑807;  
Larry  Alexander.  1992.  “What  Makes  Wrongful  Discrimination  Wrong?”  University  of  Pennsylvania  Law  
Review  14(1):  149–219.  
25  Importantly,  there  is  no  evidence  he  discriminated  in  his  choice  of  tenants;  he  merely  encouraged  black  
tenants  to  leave,  while  white  tenants  remained.  He  could  then  raise  the  rent  of  the  vacated  apartments,  
as  white  residents  were  willing  to  pay  more  money  to  live  in  an  all-­‐‑white  apartment  building.    
26  Gibson  2015.  
27  Slavny  and  Parr  ibid.  
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response   to   the   racist   beliefs   or   biases   others,   even   if   the   discriminator   himself   has  
independent  non-­‐‑objectionable  beliefs.28  
  
But  even  if  racist  beliefs  can  explain  the  wrongness  of  paying  minorities  to  leave,  such  
beliefs  do  not  quite  establish  whether  such  payments  are  impermissible.  It  is  precisely  
these  racist  beliefs  that  contribute  to  victims'ʹ  benefiting.  If  victims'ʹ  prefer  the  money  
to   leave   than  no  money   at   all,   perhaps  we  ought  not  prevent   these  payments   from  
transpiring.29  To   be   clear:   this   is   not   a   criticism   of   Belief-­‐‑based   accounts,  which   are  
intended  to  establish  wrongness,  rather  than  permissibility.  Rather,  it  is  to  emphasize  
that,  if  we  wish  to  establish  when  payments  to  leave  are  impermissible,  despite  their  
wrong-­‐‑making  features,  we  need  a  distinct  theory  from  Belief-­‐‑based  accounts.        
  
1.3  Expressive  meaning  
The   “Expressivist”   theory   is   especially   effective   at   explaining   the   wrongness   of  
payments  but,  like  Belief-­‐‑based  accounts,  also  does  not  establish  permissibility.    
  
According   to   Scanlon   and   Hellman,   both   proponents   of   this   general   theory,  
discrimination   is  wrong   because   it   expresses   an   offensive30  or   demeaning31  message  
that   minority   groups   are   “not   fully   human   or…of   equal   moral   worth.”32     One   can  
express  demeaning  messages  even  if  one  has  no  racist  or  sexist  intentions,  and  even  if  
one  is  not  aware  one  is  offending  and  demeaning  others.  If  a  principal  requests  that  
black   students  and  white   students   sit   on  opposite   sides  of   the   classroom   for  purely  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  For  example,   it   is  wrong  to  only  hire  white  salespeople  to  successfully  sell   to  white  racist  costumers.  
This  is  close  to  the  argument  raised  by  David  Benatar.  See  Benatar,  ibid,  p.  7.  
29  Indeed,  Slavney  and  Parr  suggest  the  general  possibility  that,  even  if  discrimination  is  wrong  because  
of  the  beliefs  of  the  discriminator,  discrimination  may  still  be  permissible  (or  not  “all-­‐‑things-­‐‑considered  
wrong”)  if  the  victim  benefits  significantly.  They  raise  the  example  of  a  racist  admissions  officer  in  a  low-­‐‑
ranking   university   who   hopes   to   reduce   the   number   of   dark-­‐‑skinned   students.   Rather   than   rejecting  
these  applicants,  she  persuades  the  admissions  team  at  Oxford  to  accept  them  instead.  The  students  are  
happy  with   this   result.   Slavney   and  Parr   conclude   that   “Sufficiently   large   benefits  may   be   capable   of  
defeating  the  wrongness  of  the  discrimination.”  (p.  12).  It  is  not  clear,  however,  when  such  large  benefits  
defeat   the  wrongness,  or  at   least  make   the  discriminatory  act  morally  permissible,  and   free   from  state  
interference.    
30  Thomas  Scanlon.  2008.  Moral  Dimensions:  Permissibility,  Meaning,  Blame.  Cambridge,  MA.  
31  Hellman  2008  ibid.  
32  Hellman  ibid,  35.  
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aesthetic   reasons   –   and   completely   unaware   of   the   history   of   segregation   –   his  
classification  would  be  demeaning  regardless  of  his  beliefs.33    
  
One  can  even  demean  someone  who  is  not  aware  they  are  being  demeaned.34  A  girl  
with  cognitive  disabilities  may  be  demeaned  if  taunted  on  the  playground,  even  if  her  
impairment  means  she  is  not  aware  she  is  being  taunted.  Importantly,  one  can  offend  
or   demean   another   even   if   they   benefit   in   some   ways.   Hellman   argues   this   point  
using   an   example   of   Nelson   Mandela   in   prison   on   Robin   Island.   He   and   black  
inmates  were  forced  to  wear  shorts,  clothes  normally  reserved  for  children.  Mandela  
may   have   benefited   from   cooler   clothing   on   such   a   hot   island,   but   was   wronged  
because  he  was  treated  in  an  infantilizing  manner.35  We  might  imagine  other  actions  
with   a   benefit   that   entail   a   demeaning   message.   A   woman   may   be   given   the  
opportunity   to  work   in   a   pornographic   film   that   is   violent   and   degrading   towards  
women.  Let  us  put  aside  whether  such  practices  are  wrong.36  It  seems  clearly  wrong  
to   go   up   to   a  woman   on   the   street   and   ask   if   she  would   be  willing   to   take   part   in  
violent   sexual   acts   in   return   for  money.  Offers   for   extra   options   can   be   demeaning  
even  if,  in  accepting  such  offers,  some  women  benefit  from  the  money.    
  
There  are  a  number  of  reasons  that  offers  can  be  demeaning,  even  if  recipients  benefit.  
One   reason   is   that  offers  objectify   recipients,   as   in   the   case  of   the  women  above,  or  
because  they  express  a  lack  of  sensitivity  to  historical  injustices,  as  in  the  case  of  the  
principal  segregating  children.  Beneficial  offers  can  also  demean  if  combined  with  an  
endorsement  of  racism  or  sexism,  such  as  offering  women  fewer  hours  of  work  out  of  
a   belief   that   women   are   less   capable,   but   paying   them   the   same   salary   as   men,  
benefiting   them   in   the  process.  Discriminatory   offers   can   also  demean  others  when  
treating   them   as   members   of   a   group,   rather   than   as   individuals   with   their   own  
autonomous  decisions,  preferences,  and  talents.  Benjamin  Eidelson  evokes  this  point  
with  an  example  of  an  orchestra  director  who  selects  an  East-­‐‑Asian  violinist,  despite  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33   ibid,   26.   This   example   was   original   raised   by   Paul   Brest.   See   Paul   Brest.   1975.   Processes   of  
Constitutional  Decisionmaking:  Cases  and  Materials.  Boston:  Little  Brown  and  Company.  
34  Hellman,  ibid  27.  
35  Hellman,  27.  
36  Phillips  2013  ibid;  Cynthia  A.  Stark.  1997.  “Is  Pornography  an  Action?:  The  Causal  vs.  the  Conceptual  
View  of  Pornography'ʹs  Harm,”  Social  Theory  and  Practice  23(2):277-­‐‑306;  Hellman  ibid,  42.  
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her  poor  performance,  because  he  is  influenced  by  the  stereotype  that  women  of  East-­‐‑
Asian  descent  are  better  at  playing  the  violin.  He  disrespects  her  because  he  treats  her  
as  a  member  of  a  group,  rather  than  an  individual  with  her  own  unique  character  and  
skills.  Such  actions  are  demeaning  even  if  the  violinist  benefits.37    
  
Expressivist   accounts   seem   consistent   with   the   intuition   that   the   White   Citizens’  
Council’s   actions  were   in   some  ways  wrong.   The  Council  was   treating   the  Boydes,  
and   all   African-­‐‑Americans   in   New   Orleans,   as   members   of   a   group,   rather   than  
individuals   to   be   judged   according   to   their   skills,   character,   and   unique   attributes.  
Because   the   payments   were   combined   with   an   endorsement   of   segregation,   the  
payments  also  implied  a  demeaning  message:  “We  do  not  want  you  so  much,  that  we  
are  willing  to  give  you  money  to  leave.”  Indeed,  the  greater  the  financial  benefit  for  
the   victims,   the   more   strongly   the   discriminator   is   expressing   how  much   they   are  
willing  to  sacrifice  personal  resources  to  meet  their  racist  preferences.38  In  this  sense,  
payments   are   distinct   from   merely   requesting   that   another   person   leave,   without  
offering   any   money   at   all.   The   money   is   constitutive   of   the   message,   and   so  
constitutive  of  the  wrong.39  
  
When  the  payer  does  not  endorse  racism,  the  payments  can  still  be  demeaning  if  they  
evoke   a   certain   meaning   derived   from   historical   segregation.   Imagine   a   principal  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Benjamin   Eidelson.   2013.   “Treating   People   as   Individuals”   in   (ed.)   Deborah   Hellman   and   Sophia  
Moreau,   Philosophical   Foundations   of   Discrimination   Law,   Oxford:   Oxford   University   Press.   Sometimes,  
such   treatment   is   not   demeaning,   or   seems   less   demeaning.      If   a  white  man   is   elected   because   of   his  
gender  and  ethnicity,  despite  poor  performance,  it  does  not  seem  he  is  demeaned,  despite  being  treated  
as  a  member  of  a  group,  rather  than  an  individual.  It  may  only  be  demeaning  if  the  minority  group  is  in  
some   ways   disadvantaged,   or   has   been   historically   disadvantaged.   See   Tarunabh   Khaitan.   2013.  
“Prelude  to  a  Theory  of  Discrimination  Law,”  in  (ed)  Deborah  Hellman  and  Sophia  Moreau.  Philosophical  
Foundations  of  Discrimination  Law.  Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  p.145.  
38  Indeed,  some  argue  that,  whenever  we  undermine  the  dignity  of  others,  we  are  essentially  expressing  
a   certain   offensive   message.   See   Tarunagh   Khaitan.   2012.   “Dignity   as   an   Expressive   Norm:   Neither  
Vacuous  Nor  Panacea,”  Oxford  Journal  of  Legal  Studies  32(1):1-­‐‑19.  
39  This  is  not  to  claim  that,  whenever  an  agent  pays  minorities  to  leave,  they  are  necessarily  demeaning  
these  minorities.  We  might  imagine  an  anti-­‐‑racist  NGO  that  provides  funds  to  rescue  minority  members  
from  a  racist  society.  Their  actions  may  not  be  demeaning  if  the  NGO  makes  clear  they  support  equality,  
and   provide  money   in   a   way   that  mitigates   any   offensive  meanings   that  may   arise.   They  might,   for  
example,  provide  money  alongside  lobbying  for  the  end  of  racism,  while  making  clear  that  the  payments  
are  to  help  individuals  achieve  equal  opportunity,  rather  than  to  reinforce  racial  separatism.  But  when  
payments   are  provided  as   an  endorsement   for   racism  or   sexism,  or   in  a  way   that   evokes  an  offensive  
meaning   due   to   historical   injustice   (as  with   the   principal),   then   the   payments   do   imply   a   demeaning  
message.  
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paying  black  students  to  sit  on  the  right  side  of  the  room  for  aesthetic  purposes  alone.  
This   seems  demeaning  due   to   the   historical  meaning   of   such   an   action,   even   if   the  
principal   does   not   endorse   any   form   of   racism,   and   even   if   the   black   students  
financially  benefit.  
  
The  idea  that  payments  can  be  demeaning  may  be  consistent  with  some  Harm-­‐‑based  
accounts.   If   payments   are   demeaning,   they   also   socially   exclude,40  in   the   sense   that  
individuals  are  told  how  little  they  are  valued  in  society.  If  such  social  exclusion  is  a  
harm   that   cannot   be   traded   away   for   money,41  then   payments   are   harmful   even   if  
they   involve   monetary   benefits.   We   might   also   suppose   that,   if   payments   are  
demeaning,   they   also   undermine   equality   of   opportunity,   in   the   sense   that  
individuals  no   longer  have   the  opportunity   to  be   free   from  the  demeaning  message  
implied  by  the  payments.42  Similarly,  if  demeaning  others  harms  them,  and  harming  
the   worst   off   is   what   makes   discrimination   wrong,43  then   we   can   view   demeaning  
payments   as  wrong   in   this   sense.   In   other  words,   some  Harm-­‐‑based   accounts,   like  
Expressivist  accounts,  can  view  demeaning  others  as  wrong  regardless  of  benefits.    
  
Even  if  payments  are  wrong,  this  does  not  establish  when  payments  are  permissible.  
As   Hellman   herself   notes,   her   theory   of   discrimination   does   not   “say   when   the  
wrongfulness  of  [discrimination]  may  be  overridden  by  other  considerations.”44  Other  
considerations   may   include   the   benefits   minorities   gain,   and   their   acquiescence   in  
light   of   these   benefits.   Were   the   state   to   legally   ban   payments,   this   would   deny  
minority   members   access   to   money   they   could   otherwise   obtain,   and   which   some  
wish   to   obtain.   While   the   demeaning   character   of   discrimination   constitutes   its  
wrong,  it  remains  unclear  if  the  beneficial  character  of  discrimination  can  establish  its  
permissibility.    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  Collins  ibid.  
41  Not   all   Harm-­‐‑based   theorists   support   this   conclusion,   but   this   is   implied   by   Collins’   harm-­‐‑based  
account.  See  Collins  ibid:  25.  
42  Segall  ibid.  
43  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen  2006  ibid,167.  
44  Hellman  ibid,  31.  
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Some  might  argue  that  benefits  for  victims  –  even  significant  ones  –  do  not  constitute  
a   competing  moral   consideration,   and   so   ought   not  make  wrongful   discrimination  
permissible.   Hellman   and   Yuracko   both   discuss   a   case   that   evokes   this   intuition,  
involving   a   casino   that   forced   female   workers   to   wear   makeup,   forbidding   male  
employees  from  doing  so.  For  different  reasons,  Hellman  and  Yuracko  both  conclude  
that  the  casino  wrongfully  discriminated  against  the  women.45  This  case  is  interesting,  
I  believe,  partly  because   the  employees  gained  a   salary,  were  not   forced   to  work  at  
the   casino,   and   possibly   benefited   compared   to   alternative   forms   of   employment.  
Despite   these   benefits,   I   still   feel   the   women   were   treated   in   an   impermissible  
manner,  and  the  weight  of  the  benefit  seems  insignificant.    
  
Even  if  this  is  true,  the  women  were  not  benefiting  from  the  discrimination  itself;  they  
would   still   gain   a   salary   in   a  world  where   employers   stopped   requiring  women   to  
wear  makeup,  assuming  the  casino  would  retain  its  customers  when  women  ceased  
wearing  makeup.  As  such,  if  the  government  banned  sexist  dress  codes  in  casinos,  it  
is  unlikely  women  would  be  worse  off.  This   is  not   the  case  with  payments  to   leave:  
minorities  would  lose  money  if  this  type  of  discrimination  were  banned,  because  the  
discrimination  is  precisely  what  entails  paying  individuals  money.    
  
Some  might  argue  that,  even  if  minorities  prefer  the  payments,  such  preferences  are  
not   strong   reasons   to   permit   otherwise   wrongful   discrimination.   This   is   because,  
more   generally,   preferences   hold   little   weight   in   establishing   the   permissibility   of  
wrongful   discrimination.   If   most   women   in   a   country   prefer   that   all   women   be  
banned   from   voting,   their   preferences   seem   less   important   than   our   hope   that   all  
women  are  given  the  freedom  to  vote.  But  there  is  an  important  distinction  between  
preferences   for   forced   exclusion   and   preferences   for   voluntary   incentives.   Were  
women  to  oppose  the  vote,  and  insist  they  were  not  demeaned,  we  might  claim  their  
beliefs  were   the   result  of  non-­‐‑autonomously  developed  preferences,  given   that   they  
were   denied   the   vote   their   whole   lives,   possibly   excluded   from   public   life   more  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Hellman  ibid,  46  and  Kimberly  Yuracko.  2006.  “Sameness,  Subordination,  and  Perfectionism:  Towards  
a  More  Complete  Theory  of  Employment  Discrimination  Law,”  San  Diego  Law  Review  43:  857-­‐‑897.  
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generally.46  We  cannot  quite   say   this   about   the  Boydes:  The  money   really  did  make  
their   lives   go   better.      It   would   be   odd   to   claim   that   they  were   somehow  mistaken  
about  their  own  beliefs,  the  way  a  subjugated  individual  may  falsely  believe  they  are  
not  subjugated.    
  
More   importantly,  when  minority  members  support  forced  discrimination  –  such  as  
women  supporting  banning  female  voting  –  they  are  denying  other  women  the  vote,  
including   women   who   want   to   vote.   At   the   very   least,   they   are   undermining   the  
autonomy  of  other  women,  denying  them  the  right  to  vote  if  they  ever  wish  to  vote.  
The  same  cannot  necessarily  be  said  about  the  Boydes.  When  they  boarded  the  bus,  
nobody  else  was  forced  onto  the  bus.  It  was  their  private  choice  alone.    
  
Of  course,   it  was  not  quite  their  private  choice  alone.  The  Council’s  actions,  and  the  
Boyde’s   acquiescence   to   leave,   may   have   harmed   others   in   society.   This   is   a  
possibility  I  shall  now  address.    
  
2.  Conditions  for  establishing  impermissibility  
  
Paying   minorities   to   leave   should   be   deemed   impermissible   if   at   least   one   of   two  
conditions  is  met:  first,  others  are  harmed  by  the  payments  and,  second,  recipients  fail  
to  consent  to  the  payments.    
  
2.1  Third-­‐‑party  Harm  
In  general,  harm  towards  third  parties   is  at   times  a   justified  reason  for  states  to  ban  
discrimination.   Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen   provides   the   example   of   a   natural   disaster  with  
sectarian  charities  actively  helping  their  own  congregants,  though  not  others.  Though  
the  act  of  giving  to  one’s  own  religious  sect  does  not  necessarily  demean  anyone,  and  
harms  nobody  compared  to  giving  nothing  at  all,  a  state  may  justifiably  pass  laws  to  
require   that   all   organizations   help   all   people   in   need,   to   prevent   sectarian   strife  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  For  a  discussion  on  autonomously-­‐‑developed  preferences,  see  Richard  Arneson.  1994.  “Autonomy  and  
Preference  Formation,”  in  (ed.)  Jules  L.  Coleman  and  Allen  Buchanan,  In  Harms  Way:  Essays  in  Honor  of  
Joel  Feinberg.  New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press:     42-­‐‑75;  and  Natalie  Stoljar.  2000.  “Autonomy  and  
the   Feminist   Intuition”   in   (ed)   C.  MacKenzie   and   N.   Stoljar,  Relational   Autonomy,   ed.   Oxford:   Oxford  
University  Press,  94  -­‐‑111.  
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during  an  especially  precarious  period.47  Similarly,  many  market  transactions  should  
possibly   be   illegal,  Deborah   Satz  writes,   because   of   how   they   impact   others.   In   her  
example,  a  reason  to  ban  surrogacy  services  is  that  it  reinforces  stereotypes  of  women  
as   baby-­‐‑making   machines,   and   this   may   harm   other   women.48  This   would   be   true  
even  if  the  surrogates  themselves  benefit  from  a  given  transaction.    
  
A   similar   line  of   reasoning   can  be   applied   in  paying  minorities   to   leave.  Payments,  
even  if  beneficial  towards  recipients,  can  harm  others.    
  
One  potential  harm  is  the  increase  in  implicit  bias  against  other  minority  members.  If  
the  public   is  unaware   that   there   is  an  exchange  of  payments,   they  may  assume  that  
minorities  are  less  willing  to  stay.  This  may  reinforce  stereotypes  that  certain  groups  
are  less  willing  or  capable  of  staying.  Were  a  woman  to  retire  earlier  because  she  was  
given  greater  severance  pay,  and  did  not  publicize  this  higher  severance  pay,  others  
may  believe  she  was  retiring  early  because  she  wanted  to  work  less  than  men,  when  
in  fact  she  wanted  to  retire  early  because  she  was  paid  to  leave  more  than  men.  Her  
leaving  may  reinforce  associations  between  being  a  woman  and  not  willing  to  work  
as  long.  
  
When  payments  are  publically  announced,  rather  than  kept  secret,  this  may  increase  
the  legitimacy  of  racist  and  sexist  views.  Today,  there  is  often  a  taboo  against  holding  
racist  and  sexist  preferences.   If   individuals  publically  announce  their  preferences  by  
offering  money   to   leave,   this  may   normalize   such   preferences.   Payments  may   also  
reinforce  attitudes  of  disrespect  more  generally,  normalizing  demeaning  expressions,  
effecting   those   who   never   received   offers   of   payments,   or   who   would   rather   they  
never  existed  at  all.  
  
Finally,   payments   can   undermine   efforts   to   counteract   historical   segregation,   often  
associated  with  serious  inequalities  and  injustices.  If  payments  encourage  ethnicities  
to   voluntarily   live   in   separate   neighbourhoods,   individuals   may   be   less   likely   to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Lippert-­‐‑Rasmussen  2013  ibid,  269.  
48  Satz  ibid,  130.  
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interact   with   members   of   other   ethnic   groups,   which   may   undermine   mutual  
cooperation,  often  essential  for  community-­‐‑building  and  mutual  respect.49  In  general,  
encouraging  segregation,  even  voluntary  segregation,  may  increase  disparities  along  
ethnic  lines,  contributing  to  unequal  education,  employment,  and  housing.  Because  of  
these   harms,   governments   have   strived   to   increase   integration   by   encouraging  
citizens   to   voluntary   live   in   integrated   neighbourhoods. 50   If   a   landlord   pays  
minorities  to  move  elsewhere,  the  landlord’s  actions  mitigate  such  efforts.    
  
Even  when  payments  do  not  cause  the  above  consequences,  payments  may  still  cause  
harm.  If  Hellman  is  correct  that  discrimination  is  wrong  when  it  demeans,  we  might  
claim  that  discrimination  can  be  wrong  because  it  demeans  third  parties,  even  if  they  
are  never  directly  discriminated  against.  When  a  racist  agent  pays  minorities  to  leave,  
they  are  not  only  expressing  that  they  value  certain  individuals  less  than  others.  They  
are   expressing   that   they   value   certain   characteristics   less   than   others,   and   this  
demeans   others   who   hold   these   same   characteristics.   Imagine   that   the   CEO   of   a  
company   pays   an   anchorwoman   to   retire   earlier   than   men,   though   never   paying  
other  female  employees  to  retire  earlier  than  men.  These  other  employees  understand  
that   a   characteristic   they   hold   –   their   gender   –   is   valued   less   even   if,   due   to   their  
particular   position   in   the   company,   they   are   still   valued.   Similarly,   other   African-­‐‑
Americans  in  Brooklyn,  never  paid  to  leave  their  particular  buildings,  are  exposed  to  
the  general  message  that  their  ethnicity  is  viewed  as  indicative  of  their  lesser  worth.  
Other  African-­‐‑American  residents  of  Brooklyn  are  demeaned,  regardless  of  whether  
they   personally   experience   an   increase   in   racism   or   racial   separatism   from   the  
payments.  Importantly,  they  are  demeaned  without  any  corresponding  benefit,  given  
that  they  were  never  personally  paid  to  leave.  They  were  thus  treated  in  an  all-­‐‑things-­‐‑
considered  impermissible  manner.    
  
Indeed,   the   more   public   the   payments   are,   the   more   public   the   general   message,  
impacting  both   those  offered  and  never  offered  money   to   leave.  This   is  because   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Elizabeth  Anderson.  2010.    The  Imperative  of  Integration.  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2.  
50   Ronald   Sundstrom.   2013.   “Commentary   on   Elizabeth   Anderson’s   The   Imperative   of   Integration.”  
Symposia  on  Gender,  Race,  and  Philosophy  9(2):2.  
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payments   imply   the   following  message:   “I   am  willing   to   pay  money   to   encourage  
members  of  this  group  to  leave.”  Other  members  of  the  group  understand  that,   in  a  
close  possible  world   –   a  world  where   they   lived   in   a   particular   building,   or   held   a  
different  position  in  a  company  –  they,  too,  would  be  unwanted.  And  even  when  the  
payer  is  not  endorsing  a  racist  or  sexist  message—such  as  a  landlord  whose  motives  
are  purely  financial  –  payments  can  still  demean  others.  As  noted  in  the  last  section,  
payments  are  partly  demeaning  because  they  express  the  payer’s  failure  to  recognize  
minority   members   as   individuals,   judging   them   based   on   their   ethnicity,   gender,  
sexuality,   or   other   characteristics.51  Other   minority   members   may   understand   that  
characteristics   they   posses   are   viewed   as   indicative   of   who   they   are,   treated   as  
members  of  a  group  rather  than  as  autonomous  individuals.    
  
The   above   argument   focuses   on   the   public   nature   of   the   payments,   as   a   public  
expression  of  disrespect  towards  all  members  of  a  minority  group.  I  believe  that  even  
private  payments  could  demean   third  parties.  This   is  because  discrimination  can  be  
demeaning   towards   individuals   who   are   not   aware   of   the   discrimination,   and   so  
never   personally   offended.   Return,   again,   to   the   case   of   the   girl   with   cognitive  
disabilities  who   is   taunted  on   the  playground,  demeaned  despite  being  unaware  of  
the  meaning  of  the  taunting  message,  and  so  never  personally  offended.  If  one  can  be  
demeaned   from   a   message   one   never   comprehends,   perhaps   third   parties   can   be  
demeaned  from  a  message  they  never  hear.  We  often  use  the  word  “demeaning”  in  
this  way,  as  when  we  say  women  are  demeaned  by  violent  pornography,   including  
those  who  have  never  heard  of  this  pornography.  Just  as  one  can  be  demeaned  by  a  
phenomenon  they  never  hear  of,  minorities  can  be  demeaned  by  payments   they  are  
not  aware  of.  
  
Whether   one   accepts   this   claim   depends   on   whether   one   accepts   it   is   possible   to  
wrong  someone  who  is  not  aware  they  are  wronged,  and  experiences  no  reduction  in  
welfare.   Putting   this   debate   aside,   we   can   at   least   conclude   that   public   payments  
constitute   a   clear   expressive   harm   towards   third   parties.   These   third   parties   have  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51  Eidelson  2013  ibid.  
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been   wronged   without   any   corresponding   benefits.   As   such,   they   have   been  
impermissibly  wronged.    
  
This  conclusion  may  have  implications  for  some  forms  of  indirect  payments.  Imagine  
a  Brooklyn  landlord  –  who  I  call  Adam  –  pays  another  landlord  –  who  I  call  Betty  –  
money   to   lower  her   rent  dramatically,   luring  Adam’s   black   tenants   to  Betty’s   now-­‐‑
cheaper   apartments,   leaving   only   white   tenants   behind   in   Adam’s   building,  
increasing  the  value  of  his  property.52  Even  if  this  benefits  the  tenants  who  move,  the  
transfer   of   money   from   Adam   to   Betty   still   sends   a   demeaning   message   towards  
other   minority   members   never   lured   away   from   Adam’s   apartments.   These   other  
minority  members  understand  how  much  Adam  is  willing   to  pay  to   fulfil   the  racist  
housing   preferences   of   white   tenants.   They   are   exposed   to   a   demeaning   message  
without   any   corresponding   benefit.   Adam’s   payments   also   contribute   to   harmful  
consequences  if,  in  taking  part  in  this  payment  scheme,  he  contributes  towards  racial  
separateness   and  normalizes   racist   preferences.   Like  with  direct  payments   to   leave,  
such  actions  may  be  morally  impermissible  due  to  harms  towards  third  parties.    
  
This  case,  of  course,  is  distinct  from  direct  payments:  Adam’s  actions  are  not  directly  
discriminatory,   as   he   is   sending   money   to   Betty,   and   not   to   minorities   alone.  
Nonetheless,   we   might   still   view   such   cases   in   a   similar   light   as   directly   paying  
minorities  to  leave,  given  the  effects  on  others.  
  
While   the   above   examples   all   take   place   domestically,   we   might   imagine  
governments  paying  ethnic  minorities  to   leave  the  territory  of   the  state.  As  noted  in  
the  introduction  to  this  article,  in  2010  the  British  Nationalist  Party  proposed  paying  
$78,000   to   every   non-­‐‑white   asylum   seeker  who   agreed   to   repatriate   from   the  UK.53  
More   recently,   Israel   has   begun   providing   $3,500   to   African   migrants   agreeing   to  
repatriate   or   move   to   another   country,   denying   similar   payments   to   non-­‐‑African  
migrants  of  comparable  legal  status.54    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52  A  special  thanks  to  a  reviewer    from  Politics,  Philosophy  and  Economics  for  raising  this  example.    
53  Smith  ibid.  
54  Mollie  Gerver.  Forthcoming.  ‘Paying  Refugees  to  Leave.’  Political  Studies.  
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Some   might   argue   that   such   payments   in   immigration   control   are   distinct   from  
domestic   payments.   If   states   have   a   sovereign   right   to   control   their   borders   –   a  
commonly   held   assumption55  –   they  may   have   a   sovereign   right   to   pay   non-­‐‑citizen  
minorities  to  leave.  More  generally,  principles  of  justice  in  the  international  arena  are  
distinct   from  principles   of   justice  domestically,   and   so  we   cannot   simply   apply  my  
analysis  of  domestic  payments  to  the  case  of  immigration  control.    
  
But  paying  non-­‐‑citizen  minorities  to  emigrate  may  be  a  domestic  injustice  if  payments  
demean  citizens  of  the  same  minority.  These  citizens  understand  that  a  characteristic  
they   hold   –   their   ethnicity   –   is   partly   indicative   of   their  worth   in   the   eyes   of   their  
government,   even   if   they   are   ultimately   accepted   because   of   their   citizenship.  
Christopher   Wellman,   a   strong   proponent   of   states’   right   to   exclude   immigrants,  
raises  a  similar  argument.  States,  he  concludes,  have  a  right  to  control  their  borders  to  
prioritize   citizens’   interests.   If   so,   states   are   not   permitted   to   deny   visas   based   on  
ethnicity  if  this  sets  back  citizens’  interests.  Such  policies  set  back  citizens’  interests  by  
deeply  offending  citizens  of   the  same  ethnicity.  Were   the  state   to  ban  all  non-­‐‑White  
immigrants,  for  example,  this  would  deeply  offend  non-­‐‑White  citizens,  and  so  would  
be  impermissible  on  grounds  of  domestic  justice.56    Building  on  Wellman’s  argument,  
we  can  conclude  that,  even  if  states  have  a  prima  facie  right  to  control   immigration,  
including  the  right  to  pay  unwanted  migrants  to  leave,  they  do  not  have  the  right  to  
pay  only  unwanted  ethnic  minorities  to  leave.  At  the  very  least,  states  have  weighty  
reasons  to  refrain  from  such  policies,  given  the  effects  on  their  own  citizens.  
  
In   the   case   of   both   domestic   payments,   as   with   the   Boydes,   and   international  
payments,   as   with   immigration,   I   do   not   believe   that   third   parties   are   always  
significantly   harmed   or   demeaned.   Payments  may   demean   others   less   if   they   only  
occur   privately   –   at   least,   this   is   a   possibility   I   leave   open   –   and  payments   needn’t  
reinforce   racial   separatism   or   bias   if   few   accept   the   payments.   If   the   landlord   in  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  David   Miller.   2005.   “Immigration:   The   Case   for   Its   Limits”   in   (ed.)   A.   Cohen   and   C.   Wellman.  
Contemporary  Debates  in  Applied  Ethics,  Malden,  MA:  Blackwell  Publishing:  193—206;  Christopher  Heath  
Wellman.  2008.  “Immigration  and  Freedom  of  Association,”  Ethics  119:  109—141.  
56  Wellman  ibid.  Similar  arguments  have  been  raised  by  Miller.  See  Miller  ibid.  
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Brooklyn   hadn’t   advertised   his   actions,   and   if   his   actions   were   one-­‐‑off,   we   might  
conclude  that  only  those  directly  given  money  were  significantly  demeaned,  and  the  
payments   should   possibly   remain   legal,   given   the   consent   and   benefits   for   the  
recipients.  But  given  the  public  nature  of  the  landlord’s  offer,  and  the  possibility  that  
such   offers   are   pervasive,   these   payments   are   morally   impermissible   because   they  
wrong  others  who  experience  no  benefit.  A  similar  claim  can  be  made  regarding  the  
White   Citizens’   Council.   It   offered   thousands   of   African-­‐‑Americans   payments,  
possibly   reinforcing   the   outside   status   of   blacks   in   New   Orleans,   and   demeaning  
other  black  residents  who  understood  just  how  much  they  were  not  wanted.    
  
2.2  Lack  of  Consent    
Even  when   there   is  no   clear  demeaning  message   to  others,   and  when  payments  do  
not  reinforce  bias  and  racial  separatism,  payments  are  still  impermissible  if  recipients  
have  not  consented  to  the  payments.  
  
There  are  two  groups  who  may  fail  to  consent.    
  
One  group  is  comprised  of  those  who  reject  the  payment  offer,  and  have  been  forcibly  
exposed   to   the   demeaning   offer   against   their   will,   with   no   corresponding   benefit.  
Offering  women  greater   severance  pay   to   leave,   or   offering   black   families   funds   to  
relocate,  is  clearly  impermissible  when  the  vast  majority  of  those  given  the  offer  reject  
the   offer,   even   if   no   third   parties   are   harmed.   This   is   not   to   claim   we   should  
determine  permissibility  based  on  preferences  alone.     I  merely  claim  that,   if  the  vast  
majority   reject   the   offer,   there   is   no   conflict   between   their   preferences   and   the  
wrongness  of  demeaning   treatment.  Their  preferences  have  not  been  met,   and   they  
have  been  demeaned.  57  As  such,  the  offers  are  impermissible.    
  
The   second  non-­‐‑consenting  group   is   comprised  of   individuals  who   accept   an   offer,  
but  only  because  it  was  offered.  Given  the  choice,  they  would  never  have  wanted  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57  There  is  similarly  no  conflict  between  benefits  for  minorities  and  the  demeaning  nature  of  the  offer;  the  
minorities  have  not  benefited  because   they  have  rejected   the  offer,  and   they  are  still  demeaned  by   the  
offer  itself.    
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offer   to   begin  with.58  This  may  occur  when   individuals   feel   that,   once   a  demeaning  
offer  is  on  the  table,  the  expressive  meaning  has  already  been  conveyed,  and  so  they  
may  as  well  accept  the  money  and  leave.  Individuals  may  also  accept  an  offer  to  be  
polite,  or   to  avoid  creating  tension,  while  still  wishing  the  offer  were  never  posed.59  
As   with   the   first   group,   their   preferences   have   not   been   met   and   they   have   been  
demeaned.  This  may  have  occurred  with  the  case  of  the  Brooklyn  tenants.  They  may  
have   accepted   money   because   they   preferred   leaving   than   living   under   a   racist  
landlord,   and   they  may   have   become   aware   of   his   racism   precisely   because   of   the  
money   he   offered.   These   tenants  may   have   felt   that,   given   the   choice,   they  would  
have  been  happier  had  they  never  been  offered  the  money  at  all.    
  
While  more  empirical  research  is  necessary  to  establish  whether  the  tenants  preferred  
no   offer   at   all,   a   recent   case   from   Israel   exemplifies   such   non-­‐‑consent.   In   2015   a  
woman  named  Ms.  Rabinowitz  was  seated  on  an  El-­‐‑Al  flight  near  an  ultra-­‐‑Orthodox  
man.  The  man  preferred   to   sit  next   to  men,  and   told   this   to  a   flight  attendant,  who  
then   asked   Ms.   Rabinowitz   if   she   would   like   a   better   seat   near   First   Class.   Ms.  
Rabinowitz  consented,  but  wished  she  were  never  offered  the  better  seat,  later  suing  
the  airline  for  wrongful  discrimination.60  Regardless  of  whether  this  is  truly  a  case  of  
wrongful   discrimination,   it   demonstrates   that   one   can   consent   to   an   offer   without  
consenting  to  being  given  the  offer.  If  an  individual  has  not  consented  to  being  given  
the   offer,   then   she   has   not   voluntarily   experienced   the   offer.   She   also   does   not  
subjectively   feel   she   is   benefiting   compared   to   a   world   where   the   offer   was   never  
posed.      In   this   sense,   her   experience   is   similar   to   discrimination   involving   a  
disadvantage   against   one’s   will.   Even   if   one   believes   that   a   truly   consensual   and  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  As   David   Velleman   puts   it:   “Preferring   to   accept   an   invitation   is   consistent   with   wishing   you   had  
never   received   it.”   J.   David   Velleman.   1992.   “Against   the   Right   to   Die,”   Journal   of   Medicine   and  
Philosophy  17(6):  672.    More  generally,  it  can  be  rational  to  consent  to  an  offer,  but  also  rational  to  prefer  
the  offer  never  be  available  at   all.      See  Thomas  Schelling,  The  Strategy  of  Conflict.  Cambridge:  Harvard  
University  Press  1960.    
59  Velleman   raises   similar   arguments   in   the   context   of   euthanasia.  One   reason   that   states   ought  not   to  
grant   the  right   to  euthanasia   is   that,  once  a  patient  has   the  option,   they  may  feel  pressure   to  accept   it.  
More  generally,  we  often  would  be  better  off  without  an  offer  even  if  we  would  consent  to  an  offer  once  
it  was  given.    For  example,  in  a  country  where  dueling  is  legal,  individuals  may  consent  to  duel  to  save  
their  honor;  but  many  would  prefer  to  never  have  the  option  to  duel,  to  avoid  being  in  a  position  where  
they  need  to  reject  a  duel,  and  lose  their  honor.  Velleman  ibid,  676.  
60  Isabel  Kershner.  2016.  “She  Was  Asked  to  Switch  Seats.  Now  She’s  Charging  El  Al  With  Sexism.”  New  
York  Times  26/2.  
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substantial  benefit  can  deem  an  act  permissible,  no  such  consent  or  benefit  arises  if  an  
individual  has  not  consented  to  being  offered  payments  to  leave.    
  
Some  may  claim  that,  even  if  the  vast  majority  of  minority  members  do  not  want  the  
offer,  the  offer  should  still  be  permitted  if  no  third  parties  are  harmed  or  demeaned.  If  
minorities   are   never   told   about   the   offer,   all  will   never   be   able   to   accept   the   offer,  
including   those  who  want   it.   Importantly,  we   cannot   know   if   an   individual  would  
have  consented  to  being  given  the  offer  unless   they  are  asked,  “Do  you  want  me  to  
offer   you  money   to   leave?”   and   this   question  would   be   tantamount   to   an   offer.   To  
address  this  concern,  we  may  wish  to  distinguish  between  the  ways  in  which  offers  
are  posed.  Very  public  advertisements  on  billboards,  and  very  intrusive  offers  on  the  
street,  may  be  more  demeaning  towards  those  who  do  not  want  the  offers  compared  
to   private   offers.   As   such,   if   payments   should   ever   be   permitted,   offers   should   be  
limited   to   discretely   advertised   announcements,   similar   to   the   types   of  
advertisements   for   pornography,   or   for   hiring   actors   for   pornographic   films.   Some  
may   argue   that   minorities   have   still   not   consented   to   being   exposed   to   discrete  
advertisements,  and  minorities  can  be  demeaned  by  hidden  advertisements  they  are  
unaware  of,  as  I  argued  above.  If  this  is  true,  all  offers  should  be  unpermitted.    
  
The  above  domestic  cases  are  very  different  than  immigration  cases,  where  the  state  
pays  non-­‐‑citizen  minorities  to  leave  a  country.  Assuming  citizens  are  not  harmed  or  
demeaned,   some   might   claim   that   payments   are   permissible   even   if   the   migrants  
have   not   consented.   This   is   because   non-­‐‑citizens   are   owed   less   than   citizens,   and  
because   states   have   a   sovereign   right   to   control   their   borders   even   without   the  
consent   of   would-­‐‑be   immigrants.   Indeed,   even   those   who   support   open   borders  
might  hold  that  states  are  permitted  to  pay  minorities  to  leave.    
  
Even   if   one   holds   that   states   are   permitted   to   control   immigration   by   paying   non-­‐‑
citizens  to  leave,  we  may  still  reach  a  modest  conclusion:  the  benefits  for  migrants  in  
being   paid   to   leave,   and   the   consent   they   provide   in   leaving,   is   not   a   relevant  
consideration   if   these  migrants   feel   their   lives  would  be  better  had   they  never  been  
offered  money  at  all.  As  such,  states  cannot   justify   their  actions  by  appealing   to   the  
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benefits   for  migrants   and   the   consent   they  gave.  This   leaves  open   the  possibility  of  
other  justifications  for  permitting  payments,  such  as  states’  sovereign  right  to  control  
their  territory.  
  
3.  Outlawing  payments  
  
The  above  argumentation  suggests  that  outlawing  payments  may  be  justified  if  third  
parties  are  harmed,  or   recipients  have   failed   to  consent.  Let  us  now  consider  when,  
precisely,  the  state  should  intervene.  
  
In  cases  where  minority  members  have  not  consented  to  the  payment  offers,  they  are  
victims  of  wrongful  discrimination  involving  no  countervailing  considerations.  They  
have  not  consented,  nor  do  they  feel  they  are  benefiting  compared  to  a  world  with  no  
offer   at   all.   If   they   are   sufficiently   demeaned   and   excluded,   the   offers   should   be  
outlawed,   and   the   recipients   compensated.   It   would   be   comparable   to   sexual  
harassment   cases,   where   one   person   offers   another   a   demeaning   and   explicit   offer  
they   do   not   want,   such   as   an   employer,   landlord,   or   organization   approaching   a  
woman  and  offering  her  money  to  perform  a  sexual  act.    
  
A   serious  dilemma  arises  when   individuals   consent   to   the  offer,   and  genuinely   feel  
they  are  better  off   for   its  existence,  but   their  accepting  the  offer  harms  third  parties,  
increasing  racial  separatism,  bias,  and  demeaning  expressions.    
  
In   such   cases,   there   are   two   sets   of   competing   considerations.   On   the   one   hand,  
outlawing  payments  to  leave  is  necessary  for  society  to  obtain  a  range  of  non-­‐‑material  
and   material   goods,   including   greater   respect   and   integration.   Just   as   the   state   is  
justified  in  outlawing  the  trade  of  polluting  vehicles  to  help  improve  air  quality,  the  
state  is  justified  in  banning  payments  to  protect  minority  rights.  Some  goods  must  be  
protected,  and  cannot  be  replaced  with  material  gains  for  some  members  of  society.61    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  Collins  ibid,  25.  
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On  the  other  hand,  some  minorities  may  oppose  banning  payments  to   leave,  as  this  
forces   them   to   sacrifice   potential   profits,   denying   them  much-­‐‑needed   funds   for   the  
sake   of   the   greater   good.  Were   the   government   to  prevent  minority  members   from  
accepting  payments,  perhaps  the  government  would  be  using  them  as  a  means  for  a  
societal  aim.    
  
We  may  express  these  two  competing  considerations  as  a  tension  between  individual  
and  group  rights.  Individual  minority  members  may  feel  they  have  a  right  to  engage  
in   a   private   transaction.   Society   as   a  whole,   and   groups   of  minorities  who   oppose  
payments,  may  feel  they  have  a  right  to  stop  such  transactions,  given  the  harm  they  
cause.    
  
Such  a  tension  is  common  in  other  cases  of  discrimination.    A  paradigmatic  example,  
and  which  may  help  us  establish  when  payments  should  be  banned,  is  the  1991  case  
involving  Manuel  Wackenheim,  a  man  with  dwarfism  who  would  take  part  in  a  sport  
called  “dwarf  throwing.”  This  activity  involved  large  men  throwing  Mr.  Wackenheim  
large  distances  for  entertainment,  paying  him  a  steady  income  to  participate.62  In  1991  
the   French   Ministry   of   Interior   stated   that   dwarf-­‐‑throwing   ought   to   be   banned,   a  
decision   later  upheld  by   the  Council   of   State,   and   in   2002   supported  by   the  United  
Nations  Human  Rights  Committee.   Like  with   payments   to   leave,  Mr.  Wackenheim  
benefited   from   partaking   in   “dwarf   throwing,”   but   in   taking   part   in   this   activity  
possibly   demeaned   others   with   dwarfism,   and   possibly   reinforced   negative  
stereotypes  and  implicit  biases.  Mr.  Wackeneheim  felt  that  it  was  wrong  to  deny  him  
his  occupation  for   the  greater  good  of  society,  as   this  would  be  demeaning  towards  
him,  denying  him  employment  and  a  sufficient  standard  of  life  for  the  sake  of  societal  
aims.63  
  
In  general,  debates  on  affirmative  action  entail  a  related  tension  between   individual  
and  group   rights.   There   are   some  who   argue   that   parliaments   and   the   civil   service  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  He  always  wore  a  sturdy  helmet  and  protective  gear,  so  there  was  no  significant  risk  to  his  physical  
safety.    
63  Manuel  Wackenheim  V  France,  Communication  No  854/1999,  U.N.  Doc  CCPR/C/75/854/1999(2002)  
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ought   to  represent   the  makeup  of  society,  and  that  such  representation  has   intrinsic  
value,   and   so   affirmative   action   just.  64  Such   policies   may   come   at   the   expense   of  
individual  members  of   the  majority  who,  had   it  not  been   for   the  affirmative  action,  
would   have   been   hired.65  Similarly,   some   might   deem   it   impermissible   for   the  
government   to   force   private   companies   to   institute   affirmative   action,   such   as  
requiring  that  50%  of  private  executives  be  women  or  minorities.  Such  a  policy  might  
entail   unjust   government   imposition   on   individual   liberties.   As   with   payments   to  
leave,  establishing  a  just  policy  requires  weighing  the  rights  of  individuals  against  the  
rights  of  groups.    
  
While  the  tension  between  individuals  and  groups  can  never  be  fully  resolved,  a  step  
in  the  right  direction  would  be  to  adopt  a  principle  of  proportionality.  This  principle,  
in  general,  holds   that   the  state   is  permitted   to  use  coercion  against  an   individual  so  
long  as   this  does  not   cause   the   individual   to  experience  a   reduction   in  basic  goods,  
and   so   long  as   the   coercion  helps  others  obtain  basic  goods.  Basic  goods,   I   assume,  
include   necessities   for   survival,   an   adequate   range   of   options,   and   freedom   from  
demeaning,  sexist,  and  racist  treatment.66     In  the  case  of  Mr.  Wackenheim,  we  might  
conclude   that   the   proportionality   condition  would   be  met   if  Mr.  Wackenheim   had  
access  to  an  adequate  range  of  jobs  besides  dwarf-­‐‑throwing,  and  if  banning  the  sport  
would   significantly   help   others   obtain   freedom   from   demeaning,   sexist,   and   racist  
treatment.  Similarly,  paying  minorities  to  leave  should  be  banned  if  this  ban  does  not  
cause   a   reduction   in   basic   goods   for   those   denied   the   payments,   and   if   the   ban  
significantly  helps  other  members  of  disadvantaged  groups  obtain  basic  goods.    
  
In  the  case  of  the  Boydes,  I  believe  the  proportionality  condition  was  not  met.  If   the  
US   government  was   unwilling   or   unable   to   assist   the   Boydes   obtain   a   basic   living  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Anne  Phillipps  raises  this  possibility  when  she  writes,  “the  gender  and  ethnic  composition  of  any  body  
of   representatives   is   an   important  measure   of   whether   that   body   is   indeed   ‘representative’;   and   that  
when  there  are  considerable  differences  of  experience  attached  to  being  male  or  female,  white  or  black,  
in   an   ethnic-­‐‑majority   or   ethnic  minority,   these  differences   should   be   reflected   in   any  decision-­‐‑making  
body.”  Anne  Phillips.  2004.  “Defending  Equality  of  Outcome.”  Journal  of  Political  Philosophy  12(1):  1-­‐‑19,  
9.      
65  Morris  Abrams.  1986.  “Affirmative  Action:  Fair  Shakers  and  Social  Engineers.”  Harvard  Law  Review  
99(6):1312-­‐‑1326.  
66  Khaitan  2015  ibid,  especially  “The  Duty  Bearers”,  p.  195-­‐‑214.  
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income   in  New  Orleans,   then   preventing   them   from   accessing   the   Council’s   funds  
would  place  an  unfair  burden  on  the  family.  At  the  very  least,  a  dilemma  remains  as  
to   the  best   course  of   action.   In  other   cases   the  proportionality   condition   is  met.   If   a  
company   is   providing   greater   severance   pay   to   women   to   retire   early,   and   this  
demeans   or   harms   other   women,   the   state   ought   to   intervene   to   prevent   such  
payments,  as  women  in  this  company  could  continue  to  access  sufficient  employment  
and   severance  pay   if   they   stayed.   In   cases   like   that   of   the  Brooklyn   landlord,  more  
research  is  necessary  to  understand  how  urgent   the  funds  were  for   the  tenants  who  
left.   If   they   genuinely   could   not   access   basic   necessities   without   the   payments,  
including  food  and  shelter,  we  might  suppose  that  blocking  the  transaction  would  be  
unfair  to  the  tenants.     But  if  they  could  access  an  adequate  range  of  options  without  
the  money,  it  would  be  justified  for  the  state  to  ban  such  discriminatory  payments.    
  
The  above  does  not  imply  that,  when  minorities  are  dependent  on  payments  to  access  
basic   goods,   the   state   should   simply   look   the   other   way.   The   state   has   a   duty   to  
ensure  that  basic  goods  can  be  accessed  in  ways  other  than  payments  to  leave.  But  if  
the  state  is  unable  or  unwilling  to  provide  such  alternatives,  then  they  have  weighty  
reasons  to  permit  the  payments.    
  
This  still  leaves  open  the  question  of  how,  precisely,  the  state  should  intervene.    
  
One  option  would  be  to  fine  those  who  partake  in  such  transactions.  Just  as  the  state  
fines   citizens   who   sell   polluting   vehicles   and   illegal   weapons,   because   such  
transactions   create   negative   externalities,   the   state   should   fine   those   who   pay   and  
accept  money  to  leave,  because  such  payments  create  negative  externalities  for  other  
minority  members.  But  unlike  the  sale  of  a  polluting  vehicles  or  weapons,  some  may  
feel  it  wrong  to  hold  minorities  liable  for  accepting  funds.  If  they  are  forced  to  return  
the  money,  or  pay  a  fine,  then  they  are  victims  of  demeaning  treatment  from  the  offer,  
without   any   corresponding   benefit.   An   alternative   to   forcing   recipients   to   return  
money  would   be   to   view   the  money   as   a   type   of   compensation   for   the   demeaning  
treatment  they  faced.  
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Unfortunately,   allowing   recipients   to   keep   the   money   also   encourages   future  
transactions   that   reinforce   biases,   racialism   separatism,   and   demeaning   messages  
towards   others.   An   alternative   policy   would   be   to   require   that   the   discriminator  
compensate  the  state.  This  may  be  enough  to  dissuade  agents  from  offering  payments  
in  the  future.  This  compensation  to  the  state,   in  turn,  can  be  used  to  combat  sexism,  
racism,  and  biases  that  arise  from  the  existence  of  the  payments.  	  
4.  Conclusion  
  
Many   minority   members   would   prefer   to   accept   payments   to   leave,   than   to   face  
continued   discrimination   where   they   are,   unable   to   find   a   job   or   apartment,   or  
interact  with  others  as  equals.  Others  wish  to  leave  not  because  they  face  widespread  
discrimination,   but   because   they   hope   to   find   better   opportunities   elsewhere,   far  
easier   if   they   receive   payments.  While   such   payments  may   seem   intolerable,   they  
help  minorities  escape  intolerance,  or  start  their  life  anew,  making  it  easier  to  resettle,  
find   a   job,   and   integrate   into   a   new   neighbourhood,   company,   or   city.   And  while  
such  payments  are  demeaning,  they  place  resources  into  the  hands  of  the  demeaned,  
helping  ensure  their  exit  is  smoother  than  it  otherwise  would  be,  at  times  enriching  
them  more  than  if  no  discrimination  took  place  at  all.    
  
To  consider  when  such  payments  are   impermissible,   it   is  not  enough   to  consider   if  
individuals  are  demeaned  or  harmed,  given  the  tremendous  benefits  they  can  accrue.  
We   must   appeal   to   other   considerations,   the   first   relating   to   third-­‐‑party   harm.  
Payments  are  impermissible  if  they  harm  minority  members  never  offered  assistance  
to  leave.  Such  harm  may  arise  if  payments  reinforce  biases,  contribute  to  inequality,  
or  demean  others  never  paid.  These  other  minority  members  understand   that,   in  a  
very  close  possible  world,  they  too  would  be  encouraged  to  leave,  given  extra  cash,  
severance  pay,  or  a  free  bus  ticket  to  a  distant  city,  because  their  physical  presence  is  
not  welcome.    
  
Even   if   no   third   parties   are   harmed   or   demeaned,   payments   are   impermissible   if  
recipients  wished  they  had  never  been  offered  money  at  all,  and  are  only  accepting  
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the   money   because   it   was   offered.   Such   individuals   have   been   exposed   to   a  
demeaning  choice  they  prefer  not  to  have,  and  so  are  not  benefiting  compared  to  no  
payments  at  all.  
  
In  establishing  how  the  state  should  intervene,  we  will  ultimately  face  a  dilemma.  In  
outlawing   payments   to   leave,   states   will   be   promoting   greater   tolerance   and  
integration  for  society  by  sacrificing  the  interests  of  minority  members  who  wish  to  
accept  money  to   leave.  We  ought,   I  believe,   to  adopt  a  principle  of  proportionality,  
and   refrain   from  preventing   payments  when  minority  members   are   dependent   on  
them  for  basic  goods.   In  adopting   this  approach,  states  should  still   strive   to  ensure  
individuals   are   not   dependent   on   such   payments   for   basic   goods.   And   when  
payments   do   not   protect   basic   goods,   states   ought   to   intervene   and   prevent   such  
transactions,  due  to  the  harms  they  cause  others.    
  
Accounting   for   such   harms   is   essential   for   establishing   a  more   complete   theory   of  
discrimination.  It  is  true  that  the  Boydes  preferred  to  leave  New  Orleans,  feeling  $50  
and   a   bus   ticket   provided   more   opportunities   then   staying   where   they   were.  
Nonetheless,   we   ought   to   shift   our   gaze   away   from   them,   and   onto   the   status   of  
other  minority  members.  In  doing  so,  we  can  consider  a  broader  array  of  people  and  
outcomes,  better  determining  when  discrimination  is   impermissible  and  when  state  
intervention  is  justified.    
  
